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Dunham v. Nevada, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 68 (Sep. 6, 2018)1 
CRIMINAL APPEAL: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Summary 
 The Court determined that the word “resides” in NRS 205.067(5)(b)2 does not require that 
the owner of a dwelling live permanently or continuously in the dwelling. The Court also held that 
the sentence of a maximum of 96 months in prison with parole eligibility after 38 months imposed 
on the appellant when a jury convicted him of home invasion, was not cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
 
Background 
 
 Appellant and Appellee lived in a rented a home in California. Appellee also owned a 
condominium in her name only in Stateline, Nevada. After their separation in June 2016, Appellant 
moved into the condominium, while Appellee maintained the California residence. In August 
2016, Appellee obtained a protective order, ordering Appellant to stay at least 100 yards away 
from her and from the condominium. Appellant did not abide by the protective order. On October 
21, 2016, police arrested Appellant at Appellee’s condominium. Later that day, Appellee arrived 
at the condominium to have the locks changed and have some repairs done in anticipation of 
renting the condominium out as a vacation rental. Appellee left the condominium on October 23, 
2016. On October 26, 2016, the contractor performing repairs found Appellant at the condominium 
and found the kitchen window broken. Police arrested Appellant and he was charged with home 
invasion and burglary. A jury convicted Appellant. Appellant was sentenced to 96 months in 
prison, with parole eligibility after 38 months. 
 
Discussion 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury 
 
 Appellant argued that his proposed jury instruction should have been allowed, which stated 
that “resides” as used in the home invasion statute in Nevada should be interpreted as requiring 
the dwelling be permanently or continuously occupied. Appellant’s proposed jury instruction was 
taken from Petrowsky v. Krause,3 a Wisonsin case. The Court held, however, that the Petrowsky 
case was distinguishable from Appellant’s case because the court in the Petrowsky considered an 
instruction based on a domestic violence statute, not a property-related statute.  In Petrowsky, the 
purpose in defining “reside” was to determine who was a “household member.” Appellant argued 
that he was entitled to his jury instruction because under Crawford v. State, the defense is entitled 
to instruct the jury on their theory of the case.4 The Court held, however, that although the defense 
 
1  By Katrina Brandhagen.  
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.067(5)(b) (2017). 
3  588, N.W.2d 318, 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). 
4  121 Nev. 744, 751, 121 P.3d 582,586 (2005). 
is entitled to those instructions, they are not allowed to give “misleading, inaccurate, or 
duplicitous” instructions.5 
 The plain language of NRS 205.067(1)6 indicates that a dwelling is inhabited when the 
owner or other lawful occupant resides in it. However, the Court held that the word “resides” does 
not require permanent or continuous presence in the dwelling. Since the dwelling in question was 
a vacation home, Appellee could still be “residing” in the condominium, even if she only intended 
to return and continue to use it as a “sleeping place”7 in the future. The purpose of using the word 
“resides” in NRS 205.067(5)(b)8 is to determine which dwelling places should have more 
protection than uninhabited ones. 
 While the Petrowsky case’s definition of “reside” in determining who a “household 
member” is would require permanency and continuity, inhabiting a dwelling does not require that 
same degree of permanency and continuity. The present case is more similar to Hess v. State,9 than 
it is to Petrowsky. In Hess, the Court held that “[t]here is no requirement in the law that a house 
be continuously occupied in order to be a ‘dwelling.’  It is sufficient that it is occasionally occupied 
for residential purposes.”10 The present case is also similar to State v. Kautz,11 which said that 
residence was still a dwelling, even though it had been empty for six months.12  
 Because the language and purpose of the NRS 205.067(5)(b)13 does not require the 
permanence and continuity that the appellant wanted to indicate in his jury instruction, the Court 
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Appellant’s jury instruction. To 
allow the jury instruction would have been an inaccurate statement of law. 
 
Appellant’s sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment 
 
 Appellant argues that because he only had one misdemeanor, had substance abuse 
problems, had familial support, and he was a good father, his sentence of 96 months in prison with 
parole eligibility after 38 months should be considered cruel and unusual punishment. The Court, 
however, considers that NRS 205.067(2)14 provides that “a person convicted of home invasion can 
be sentence to a minimum term of 1 year in prison and to a maximum term of 10 years.” Since 
Appellant’s sentence falls within those parameters, it is not cruel and unusual punishment.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held that the district court did not err when it refused the appellant’s jury 
instruction because it would have been an inaccurate statement of law. Further, the sentence 
imposed on Appellant is not cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence falls within the 
parameters of NRS 205.067(2).15 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision. 
 
5  Id. at 754, 121 P.3d at 589. 
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.067(1) (2017). 
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.081(2017). 
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.067(5)(b) (2017). 
9  207 S.E. 2d 580, 581 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974). 
10  Id. at 582 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
11  39 P.3d 937, 939–40 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
12  Id. 
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